Holding the Media Accountable

If the media holds politicians accountable, then we must hold them accountable!
One of the fundamental responsibilities of a free press's fundamental responsibilities is to provide the public with accurate, complete, and responsible reporting. Journalists play an important role in holding elected officials, candidates, and government institutions accountable. But accountability cannot be a one-way street. If the media expects politicians to answer for their actions and statements, journalists and media organizations must be willing to answer for the accuracy and completeness of their own reporting.
Unfortunately, I have become increasingly concerned about the accuracy of reporting by some South Dakota media outlets.
Most recently, KELOLAND published an article by Bob Mercer titled "SD Supreme Court affirms a legislative candidacy", reporting on the South Dakota Supreme Court's decision involving my challenge to Celestine Stadnick's District 27 Senate candidacy. You can read the Supreme Court's Opinion here:
The KELOLAND article has one significant problem: the journalist cannot even get my first name right.
My name is Anthony Kathol, not William Kathol.

I actually contacted my mom tonight and asked her, "When did you change my name to William?" I thought she would have told me if there had been a name change!
While there is a little humor in that question, the underlying issue is serious. If a journalist cannot get the name of one of the principal individuals involved in a high-profile election case correct, what confidence should readers have in the accuracy of the rest of the reporting?
This is not an isolated incident. I have now requested corrections to three articles published by two different journalists concerning this election litigation. I am not asking journalists to agree with my positions or legal arguments. I am asking them to report the facts accurately and provide readers with the information necessary to understand the issues.
What was missing from the reporting?
Beyond getting my name wrong, I believe the KELOLAND article omitted important statutory language that would have helped readers understand what was actually at stake in this South Dakota Supreme Court case.
Two provisions of South Dakota law are particularly important.
1. SDCL 12-1-13 expressly preserves other legal remedies
The KELOLAND article discusses how the Supreme Court determined that I chose a particular procedural avenue when challenging Stadnick's petition and that this choice limited what the circuit court could review on appeal.
Justice Myren explained that I had several routes available to challenge the candidacy. The article quotes his conclusion that the circuit court exceeded its appellate authority by considering signature challenges that were not raised in my original affidavit before the Secretary of State.
However, the article does not reproduce the relevant language of SDCL 12-1-13, which is central to understanding the procedural issue.
The statute states:
"A failure to challenge a petition in accordance with this section does not deny a person any other legal remedy to challenge the filing of a nominating, initiative, or referendum petition in circuit court. A challenge to a petition in circuit court may include items prohibited in this section."
This language is important. The Legislature expressly recognized that the administrative challenge process is not the only legal avenue available to someone challenging a nominating petition. It also expressly preserved the ability to raise certain challenges in circuit court that are prohibited during the administrative process.
The Supreme Court addressed this provision in paragraph 10 of its opinion. Justice Myren also referenced SDCL 12-1-16, which provides that a person who fails to challenge a petition under SDCL 12-1-13 is not precluded from pursuing another legal remedy.
The Court then explained that SDCL 12-1-16 does not independently create a cause of action. Instead, it relied on two previous South Dakota Supreme Court decisions identifying traditional remedies:
Larson v. Hazeltine, 1996 S.D. 100, which involved a writ of mandamus.
Bridgman v. Koch, 2013 S.D. 83, which involved a writ of quo warranto.
There is an important distinction here that deserves further explanation.
SDCL 12-1-13 expressly preserves other legal remedies in circuit court, but it does not specifically identify mandamus or quo warranto as the procedures a challenger must use. The Supreme Court relied on prior judicial decisions to identify those remedies. Since I was unable to find legal counsel willing to take on the case, how was I supposed to know that I needed to pursue a different legal remedy rather than follow the statutory process as it was written? Should an ordinary citizen be expected to research decades of judicial decisions to determine the proper procedure when the Legislature has established a specific process in state law?
I have questions about how those alternative remedies would have applied to my particular circumstances. For example, Bridgman v. Koch involved a challenge to an individual's right to hold public office after an election. How would that remedy have applied to a challenge involving a candidate's nominating petition before the general election?
Similarly, mandamus is a specific legal remedy generally used to compel a public official to perform a legally required duty when an adequate ordinary remedy is unavailable. It is not simply another opportunity to appeal an administrative decision.
I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court had no legal basis for identifying these remedies. I am suggesting that readers deserve to understand the distinction between the administrative appeal process and the separate legal remedies recognized by statute and judicial precedent.
If the Legislature has established an administrative process for challenging nominating petitions, it should also be clear about the alternative remedies available, the circumstances in which they apply, and the procedures a challenger must follow.
2. HB 1256 changed the statutory requirements for petition signers
The second important provision is SDCL 12-6-8, which was amended by the Legislature through House Bill 1256 in 2025.
The KELOLAND article discusses my challenge involving petition signatures where voters identified their county of registration as "Oglala" rather than "Oglala Lakota." However, it does not reproduce the actual statutory language that prompted my argument or explain the significance of the legislative change. The author merely provides a hyperlink to the specific codified law.
As amended by HB 1256, SDCL 12-6-8 states:
"The circulator or the individual who signs the petition shall add the address at which the individual is currently registered to vote, the county in which the individual is registered as a voter, and the date of signing."
This was a substantive change made by the Legislature. The previous statutory language required the signer to provide a place of residence and the date of signing. The amended law specifically requires the address at which the individual is currently registered to vote and the county in which that individual is registered.
Why is this important?
Because the Legislature deliberately added identifying information to the petition-signing requirements. My argument before the courts was that these additional statutory requirements should be given effect and that the doctrine of substantial compliance should not be used to excuse deficiencies in information the Legislature specifically required.
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with my interpretation, concluding that substantial compliance could still apply and that identifying the county as "Oglala" was sufficient in this particular instance.
Substantial Compliance or Judicial Reconstruction?
There is another aspect of this decision that deserves explanation. The Supreme Court and the KELOLAND article both rely on the term "substantial compliance" to describe why the entry "Oglala" was accepted in place of "Oglala Lakota." But there is a distinction between interpreting information that was provided and reconstructing information that was not fully provided.
In my briefs, I raised concerns about what I described as judicial reconstruction. The Legislature amended SDCL 12-6-8 to specifically require the circulator or signer to provide the county in which the individual is registered to vote. The question I raised was whether a court should be permitted to infer that "Oglala" means "Oglala Lakota" when the statute requires the county to be identified.
The Supreme Court concluded that the signer had not omitted the county but had provided an "abbreviated, but clearly recognizable version." In other words, the Court accepted the abbreviated designation because it could reasonably infer which county the signer intended to identify.
I understand the Court's reasoning. However, my concern remains: where does statutory interpretation end and judicial reconstruction begin? If the Legislature specifies the information that must be provided, should a court be able to supply the meaning of an incomplete designation based on what it believes the signer intended?
Consider South Dakota's other counties with two-word names, including Fall River, Bon Homme, and Charles Mix. Would writing only "River," "Homme," or "Mix" be sufficient to identify those counties? Would we automatically assume which county the signer intended? The Supreme Court did not decide these hypothetical situations, but they illustrate why consistency in applying statutory requirements matters.
This is not merely a disagreement over a technicality. It concerns how much latitude courts and election officials have to infer information when the Legislature has expressly identified what a petition must contain. The Legislature specifically required the county in which an individual is registered as a voter to be identified. When the Legislature establishes requirements for election petitions, those requirements should be applied consistently.
I recognize that the Supreme Court ruled on the particular "Oglala" designation before it. Readers can disagree with my legal interpretation or the Court's conclusion. That is not the point. The point is that readers should have been given the actual statutory language and legislative context to understand why this issue was being litigated in the first place. Words matter.
What did the Supreme Court actually decide?
There is another important aspect of the decision that deserves attention.
On October 29, 2026 – five days before the General Election – the South Dakota Supreme Court issued its corrected Order of Affirmance. The order affirmed the circuit court's order and stated that a written opinion would follow.
The written opinion was filed November 10 and released publicly on November 12, following the Veterans Day holiday. I received the opinion by email on the morning of November 12, before its release to the public.
In that opinion, the Supreme Court specifically determined that the circuit court exceeded its appellate authority by considering signature challenges that had not been raised in my original affidavit before the Secretary of State.
In paragraph 11, the Court stated:
"The circuit court exceeded its appellate authority by considering challenges to signatures that were not raised in Kathol's affidavit and that the Secretary did not consider during its review."
That is a significant legal finding. The Court ultimately affirmed Stadnick's certification, but it also determined that the circuit court had exceeded the scope of its appellate authority.
There is an important distinction between the Court affirming the certification and the Court determining that every additional signature challenge raised in circuit court was without merit. The Supreme Court confined its review to the challenges properly presented to the Secretary of State.
Both parts of that decision deserve to be reported.
I respect the authority of the South Dakota Supreme Court, even when I disagree with its interpretation of the law. However, respecting the judicial process does not mean that the public should be deprived of the legal context necessary to understand a court's decision.
Accountability must work both ways
I understand that journalists work under deadlines and that reporting complicated legal proceedings is not always easy. I also recognize that articles cannot reproduce every argument, statute, or procedural detail involved in a case.
I also acknowledge that the KELOLAND article included a hyperlink to SDCL 12-1-14, which addresses the requirements for verifying a candidate's declaration of candidacy. Providing hyperlinks to primary legal sources is helpful. However, linking to one statute is not a substitute for explaining the other statutory provisions that are central to the legal dispute.
There is a difference between simplifying a complicated legal matter and omitting statutory language that is central to understanding the dispute.
Getting someone's name wrong is a basic factual error. Failing to explain the relevant statutory language and legislative changes leaves readers without important context. Together, these issues raise legitimate questions about editorial oversight, fact-checking, and the standards of accuracy applied to reporting.
Our institutions depend on public trust. That includes our legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, as well as the media organizations that report on them.
A free press is essential to a functioning constitutional republic. Journalists should ask tough questions, investigate government decisions, challenge public officials, and hold those in positions of authority accountable. I welcome that scrutiny. In fact, I believe it is necessary.
But the media should not consider itself exempt from the same standards of accountability it expects from everyone else.
As I begin my service in the South Dakota Senate, I intend to be accountable to the people of District 27. I expect questions, scrutiny, and constructive criticism. I welcome them. However, I also expect the reporting about my work and the issues affecting our state to be accurate, fair, and balanced.
If we want the public to have confidence in our institutions, we must demand accuracy, transparency, and accountability from all of them.
Accountability is not a one-way street. Words matter.




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